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Conceptual issues on Kant’s theory of inner experience*
Abstract: this paper discusses the use of certain terms associated to I. Kant’s account of inner 
experience. Inner experience is a subject matter relevant in Kant’s thought, which encompasses 
metaphysical and anthropological issues worthy of consideration. By examining the Critique of Pure 
Reason and the Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view, one can see the confused use of the 
terms: inner sense, empirical, pure, and transcendental apperception, discursive and intuitive self-
consciousness, consciousness of oneself divided into reflection and apprehension, intellectual and 
empirical consciousness of one’s existence. Therefore, I focus on the philosophical meaning of the 
previous terms and their relation to the problem of inner experience, which depends upon the outer 
experience. Finally, I deal with the problem of the content of inner sense, suggesting that its content 
does not correspond to a single, simple thing, but rather to a flux of inner representations. 
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Cuestiones conceptuales sobre la teoría 
de la experiencia interna en Kant
Resumen: en este artículo se debate el uso de ciertos términos asociados a la teoría de la experiencia 
interna de Kant. La experiencia interna es un tema relevante en el pensamiento de Kant, el cual 
comprende problemas metafísicos y antropológicos dignos de consideración. Al examinar la Crítica 
de la Razón Pura y la Antropología en sentido pragmático se puede evidenciar el uso confuso de 
los términos: sentido interno, apercepción empírica, pura y trascendental, autoconciencia discursiva 
e intuitiva, conciencia de sí mismo dividida en reflexión y aprehensión y conciencia intelectual y 
empírica de la existencia de uno mismo. Por consiguiente, me centro en el significado filosófico de 
los anteriores términos y de su relación con el problema de la experiencia interna, la cual depende de 
la experiencia externa. Finalmente, abordo el problema del contenido del sentido interno, sugiriendo 
que su contenido no corresponde al de una cosa simple sino al de un flujo de representaciones 
internas. 
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Conceptual issues on Kant’s theory of inner experience
As far as the historical dimension of inner sense is concerned, Udo Thiel (1997) 
maintains that there was little examination of the notion of inner sense, at least 
until the late 1760s. It was probably the result of the orthodox belief, throughout 
the eighteenth century, that humans had an ability to perceive our inner states and 
acts. However, inner sense became more studied by German empirical psychology 
in the 1770s, through writers such as Christoph Meiners (1747-1810) and Michael 
Hissmann (1752-1784). Inner sense is still today a problematic subject matter in 
philosophy1 which, even before Kant, had been regarded as an accepted condition 
under which we can observe or “introspect” our own mental states.  In this vein, 
inner sense constitutes a source of knowledge of ourselves as individuals, namely, 
of the human mind in general (Thiel, 1997). However, our capacity of saying these 
inner states (e.g. states of anger, pleasure, fear, etc.) are my states does not rely on 
the inner sense but rather on apperception. Moreover, Sahabeddin Yalcin rightly 
claims that “Kant’s concept of self-knowledge depends upon his notion of inner 
sense” (Yalcin, 2002, p. 182).
1. Inner sense and apperception
Kant points out in CPR2 B152 that inner sense was identified with the 
faculty of apperception in the systems of psychology during the XVIII century. 
He, nonetheless, argued for its differentiation, claiming that inner sense should 
constitute the subject matter of psychology, whereas apperception should be 
that of logic (Kant, 1900, AA 7:141; 1998, CPR A106-7, B132; Schulting, 2015). 
Of course, such a distinction can be correctly identified if we precise the term 
1 For current discussions on inner sense, see Shoemaker (1994), Lycan (1996), Carruthers (2011), 
Roche (2013), Picciuto & Carruthers (2014), among others.
2 References to Kant’s works are by volume and page of Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften 
(ed.) (so-called Akademie edition), 1902–, Kants gesammelte Schriften, 29 vols., Berlin: Georg Reimer 
(later Walter De Gruyter) (AA). References to the Critique of pure Reason use the standard notation 
(CPR) followed by the pages of its first (1781) and second (1787) edition (A/B). Translations are from 
the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant; it should be noted, nonetheless, that I have 
occasionally modified these translations. Where there is no reference to an English translation, the 
translation is my own. Here and throughout the article the gender‐unspecific reference (mind, subject, 
human being) is made with the pronoun ‘it’ and its cognates.
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apperception, mentioning that apperception can be either pure or empirical. 
Empirical apperception is related to the empirical consciousness of ourselves, and 
is tantamount to inner sense. Empirical apperception is identified with a certain 
form of self-consciousness in the CPR and in Metaphysika Dohna (1792-3), where 
Kant claims: “we name only one inner sense - the faculty of the consciousness of 
one’s own existence - in time empirical apperception” (Kant, 1900, AA 28:673). 
Pure apperception, by contrast, is related to the synthesis of the empirical manifold 
given in sensibility, the objective formulation of judgements and the transcendental 
self-consciousness (1998, CPR B68, A105, B138-9, B142, B157).
Inner sense provides us with an empirical manifold that only can be connected 
by the pure apperception through the categories (1998, CPR B154). It means that 
inner sense alone does not give the consciousness of such states as belonging to 
ourselves, for “all manifold of intuition has a necessary relation to the I think 
[emphasis added] in the same subject in which this manifold is to be encountered. 
But this representation is an act of spontaneity [emphasis added], i.e., it cannot 
be regarded as belonging to sensibility” (1998, CPR B132). In other words, we 
demand the representation ‘I think’ by which all our representations are related 
to our consciousness (Mohr, 1991; Howell, 2001; Aquila, 1983).  As a result, 
pure apperception is an active faculty grounded on the understanding, while inner 
sense is a passive faculty, grounded on sensibility, which does not contain yet any 
determinate intuition (1998, CPR B158; 1900, AA 7:140-1). 
Moreover, Kant attributes different terms to two kinds of self-consciousness, 
which take place in an empirical or transcendental level respectively. These 
terms can be grouped as follows: i) discursive and intuitive self-consciousness, ii) 
consciousness of oneself divided into reflection and apprehension, iii) intellectual 
and empirical consciousness of my existence and iv) transcendental and empirical 
apperception. I shall provide an explanation of every group.
 
First, Kant holds that “consciousness of oneself is either discursive in concept 
or intuitive in the inner intuition of time. - The “I” of apperception is simple and 
binding” (1900, AA 7:143 footnote). In the discursive self-consciousness the “I” is 
regarded as a simple representation, while in the intuitive consciousness the “I” is 
regarded as a manifold of associated representations in time. Kant indirectly equates 
these forms of self-consciousness with discursive and intuitive apperception. 
These two forms of apperceptions represent ‘a doubled consciousness of the I’ 
(ein doppeltes Bewußtseyn dieses Ich); the former is the “I” of mere thinking, 
which belongs to logic and has no content, while the latter is the “I” of inner 
perception which belongs to anthropology and has a content provided by inner 
sense (1900, AA 7:397-8; Dessoir, 1924). This discursive consciousness is nothing 
but a reflection, which is a consciousness of the activity in the combination of the 
manifold of representation according to the rule of unity of that manifold (1998, 
CPR B158-9; 1900, AA 7:141). Moreover, discursive consciousness is regarded as 
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a pure apperception of one’s mental activity, so that “the “I” of reflection contains 
no manifold in itself and is always one and the same in every judgment, because 
it is merely the formal element of consciousness” (1900, AA 7:141). Therefore, 
Kant ascribes an epistemological function to this form of consciousness, without 
which the synthetic power of the understanding could not connect the manifold 
of intuition through concepts and judgements. 
Moreover, the intuitive consciousness refers to the manifold of our inner states 
which is represented through our inner sense as related in time: “the I [emphasis 
added] of apprehension is a matter of a manifold with representations joined to 
one another in the I as object of intuition” (1900, AA 7:143 footnote). Inner sense 
should not be identified with inner experience, but as a necessary condition of 
inner experience (Monzel, 1920), for inner sense contains the material of our 
consciousness, namely a manifold of empirical inner intuition which can be 
apprehended and represented as something that belongs to the “I”. In this form 
of consciousness, the “I” is represented through inner empirical intuition, that 
is to say the ‘I’ is affected inwardly by experiences according to successive or 
simultaneous relations of time (1900, AA 7:141-2).
Second, Kant states that the consciousness of oneself can be divided into 
reflection and apprehension; the first one is consciousness of the understanding, 
while the second one is consciousness of inner sense. In Kant’s own words, “inner 
activity (spontaneity), by means of which a concept (a thought) becomes possible, 
or reflection; and receptiveness (receptivity), by means of which a perception 
(perceptio), i.e., empirical intuition, becomes possible, or apprehension” (1900, 
AA 7:134 footnote). The first kind of consciousness provides us with the simple 
representation ‘I’ that lacks any intuitive content, whereas apprehension provides 
the ‘I’ that contains an empirical manifold which makes an inner experience of 
our states possible (1998, CPR B408; Sturm, 2017). Kant’s view of apprehension, 
regarded as a condition for the possibility of empirical intuition, can be identified 
with the synthesis of apprehension performed by imagination, which is nothing 
but “the composition of the manifold in an empirical intuition, through which 
perception, i.e., empirical consciousness of it (as appearance), becomes possible” 
(1998, CPR B160; B164). 
Third, Kant maintains that the intellectual consciousness of our existence is 
concerned with the representation I am, which is not an intuition, but rather 
an intellectual representation that accompanies all judgements and actions of 
our understanding (1998, CPR BXXXIX-XL, B277-8; 1900, AA 7:134 footnote). 
This intellectual consciousness seems to be no other than the synthetic original 
unity of apperception according to which “I am conscious of myself not as I 
appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that [emphasis added] I am. 
This representation is a thinking, not an intuiting” (1998, CPR B157). In the early 
1790s, Kant declares that we represent us to ourselves in every thought through 
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intellectual consciousness. However, he further holds that “I” cannot “cognize 
myself” by means of it. I only cognize, by means of it, that I am that which makes the 
act of the understanding, namely, that “I am” (1900, AA 28:712). He, by contrast, 
describes empirical consciousness as that by means of which we are conscious 
of our existence in time. This empirical consciousness informs us about changes 
in our mind, which can only be determined, if we represent the existence of 
something persistent through outer sense. Kant emphasizes that “inner experience 
itself is consequently only mediate and possible only through outer experience” 
(1998, CPR B277). 
I am in agreement with Arthur Melnick’s contrast between the empirical 
self and the transcendental self. He claims that the first one is nothing but “the 
perceiving states that appear to me in inner attending”, whereas the second one 
is the “intellectual thinking subject I am”. However, he attacks those who, like 
Peter Strawson and David Carr, inflate the transcendental self to a noumenal 
a-temporal entity. Melnick’s approach to the problem of inner attending starts by 
not considering as conclusive the claims: i) “the self appeared to” is noumenal and 
ii) we are mere appearances, since we can only reach a non-noumenal grasp of 
ourselves and our identity (Melnick, 2009). He further suggests that there is a third 
mode of existence which is neither noumenal nor phenomenal:
It is this existence which is appeared to, which grasps itself in transcendental 
self-consciousness, and which, through being thus appeared to, is fixed or 
identical or abiding. This existence is the accompanying intellectual action 
I am in determining (unifying) my inner attending and is itself determined 
(fixed through variation) by being the identical intellectual action that keeps 
up with the attending. (Melnick, 2009, p. 125)
I contend that Melnick’s proposal of this third mode of existence does not 
help us to understand Kant’s account of the self and that such mode of existence 
is a combination of the first two modes of existence, which finds no place in 
Kant’s texts. On the one hand, Kant is reluctant to admit a noumenal cognition 
of the self since human beings are incapable of reaching noumenal cognition in 
general. It means that we can only attain a phenomenal cognition of the self which 
involves intuitions, feelings and other representations related in time, present in 
appearances. On the other, his reference to B157–158 provides no evidence of 
this third mode of existence, but rather explains the existence of a transcendental 
“I” that cannot be perceived as any other appearance. Instead, it is a primordial 
unity of consciousness whose existence must be presupposed at a logical level.
Furthermore, Kant holds in the CPR and in the Anthropology that we cognize 
ourselves as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves (1998, CPR B152-
3; 1900, AA 7:398). Time, as form of inner sense, rules all our representations, 
including those intuitions of our inner states:  
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However, that we only cognize ourselves through inner sense as we 
appear to ourselves is clear from this: apprehension (apprehensio) of the 
impressions of inner sense presupposes a formal condition of inner intuition 
of the subject, namely time, which is not a concept of understanding and 
is therefore valid merely as a subjective condition according to which inner 
sensations are given to us by virtue of the constitution of the human soul. 
(1900, AA 7:142) 
In my view, the transcendental function ascribed to time in the CPR is 
fundamental for comprehending the pragmatic-observational doctrine of human 
nature in the Anthropology, since time grounds human thought and action. 
However, Kant does not focus on physiological anthropology, which deals with 
the investigation of the human being’s limitations determined by nature, but on 
pragmatic anthropology that is concerned with the human being’s potentialities as 
a free acting being (1900, AA 7:119; Pappe, 1961; Foucault, 2008). 
Fourth, Kant maintains in the first edition of CPR that transcendental 
apperception is an original and transcendental ground of “the unity of the 
consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions, hence also of 
the concepts of objects in general, consequently also of all objects of experience” 
(1998, CPR A106). In other words, this form of apperception is an objective 
condition of experience, because provides a unity of consciousness without which 
we cannot intuit nor think of objects (Schulting, 2015). On the contrary, Kant 
claims about the empirical apperception that: “the consciousness of oneself in 
accordance with the determinations of our state in internal perception is merely 
empirical, forever variable; it can provide no standing or abiding self in this 
stream of inner appearances” (1998, CPR A107; translation modified slightly). 
Kant further notes in his handwritten draft of the Anthropology that by means of 
empirical apperception, the subject attends to itself, i.e. it affects itself, and, as a 
result, certain representations related in time (simultaneously or in succession) 
are brought to consciousness (1900, AA 7:399). In the same way, Kant claims in 
Metaphysik K2 that empirical apperception is “when I am conscious of myself 
by means of inner sense”3 (1900, AA 28:712; my own translation). H. J. Paton 
suggests that empirical apperception is not only concerned with the consciousness 
of our mental states but also with the very possibility of cognition of external 
objects: 
Empirical apperception is said to be concerned with the states of mind, but 
it must at the same time be concerned, not only with the order in which 
these arise in our mental history, but also with the particular way in which 
(as appearances) they are combined in the object. (Paton, 1939a, p. 402) 
3 “Wenn ich mir vermittelst meines innern Sinnes bewusst bin” (1900, AA 28:712).
120
Revista Filosofía UIS, vol. 19 n.° 2, julio - diciembre 2020
Héctor Luis Pacheco Acosta
I deem problematic his interpretation in as much as it destroys Kantian 
boundary between empirical and pure apperception, that is, between the 
empirical consciousness of a representation given to us in experience and the a 
priori condition of that consciousness. It means that the particular way in which 
appearances are “combined” in the object cannot be an object of the empirical 
apperception, because it is the result of the synthesis a priori of the manifold given 
in intuition through the categories of the understanding. In the second edition of 
the CPR, Kant suggests that the empirical unity of apperception is derived from the 
transcendental unity of apperception and cannot be necessarily and universally 
valid but it has merely a subjective validity, because it is concerned with an 
empirical association of representations that may differ in each person (1998, CPR 
B140).
To sum up, the first group of terms related to the transcendental self-
consciousness deal with the consciousness of both the connection of the manifold 
and the fact that all representations belong to the same subject. Needless to say, 
this group operates at the pure, discursive, objective or logical level of human 
cognition. The second group related to the empirical self-consciousness, elicited 
by our inner sense, points out an empirical consciousness of oneself that operates 
at the empirical, intuitive, subjective or psychological level of human cognition. 
However, the latter form of cognition should not be thought of as a source of 
chaotic unrelated representations but as representations temporally related of 
our own existence, which are subject to the synthesis of our understanding. On 
this point, I am in agreement with Aquila’s claim that “what Kant calls “empirical 
apperception,” or “inner sense,” is the awareness of oneself insofar as one is aware 
of particular stretches of intuited time “synthesizable” together with others into the 
right sort of whole” (Aquila, 1983, p. 175). 
2. The content of inner sense
Any attempt to show the object of inner sense must deal with the difficulty that 
there is not a specific object but an array of different things that can be regarded 
as object of inner sense (Mohr, 1991). It is to an extent comprehensible Andrew 
Brook’s claim: “Kant’s doctrine of inner sense is a mess, and to sort it out would 
take more space than the task is worth” (Brook, 1994, p. 78). This difficulty is 
partly the result of an unsystematic treatment of inner sense in the CPR and Kant’s 
customary statement that all appearances in general belong to inner sense (1998, 
CPR A98-9, B67, A34/B50). 
I contend that inner sense contains the material of consciousness and a 
manifold of empirical inner intuition, namely the “I” of empirical apprehension 
(1998, CPR A22-3/B37; 1900, AA 7:134 footnote, 142-3). Kant identifies inner 
sense with empirical apperception, by which the subject is conscious of empirical 
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representations of its own mental states (1998, CPR A107; 1900, AA 28:673; 
7:399). However, inner sense does not provide us with the intuition of one object 
given in experience, to which the terms substance, one, abiding, and identical 
over time can be attributed. That is to say, we cannot obtain from experience any 
intuition of the “unity” of the self, nor a representation of something numerically 
the same, or abiding in us (Brook, 1994; Allison, 2004). In contrast, we can only 
reach a cluster of intuitions, perceptions, imaginings, memories, and so on:
The consciousness of oneself in accordance with the determinations of 
our state in internal perception is merely empirical, forever variable; it can 
provide no standing or abiding self in this stream of inner appearances, and 
is customarily called inner sense or empirical apperception [emphasis 
added]. (1998, CPR A107) 
Accordingly, no “fixed” or “abiding” self can be object of empirical 
consciousness because the empirical apperception can only provide the intuition 
of appearances that are nothing but subjective occurrences governed by time 
(1900, AA 8:154; 7:397). On the contrary, we represent us to ourselves, via 
inner sense, as a ‘stream’ (Fluss) of inner appearances, in which no intuition of 
numerical identity can be found (1998, CPR A363-4; Brook, 1994). However, the 
flow of mental representations in empirical consciousness does not imply that time 
itself is a flow of consciousness, nor that it is a sort of psychological event (1998, 
CPR A36-7/B53). On the contrary, time, as form of inner sense, is a necessary 
condition of the flow because it links our representations according to relations 
of present, past, and future, succession and simultaneity (Pacheco Acosta, 2018). 
Thus, I agree with Mathew S. Rukgaber who holds that “Kant must mean that the 
“form” of inner sense describes a structural feature of our perspective that enables 
determinate temporal extents like the flow of consciousness” (Rukgaber, 2009, p. 
180). Strawson has taken the same direction and has suggested that the self is not 
given to us as a single, simple thing, but rather as “a flux of inner representations, 
a succession of constantly changing, albeit connected, perceptions” (Strawson, 
1997, p. 266). In other words, our inner sense can only inform us about relations 
between representations of our inner states. 
I suggest that both David Hume and Kant are reluctant to admit that human 
being is capable of an ‘intuition’ or ‘perception’ of the unity or singleness of the 
self.  Such idea is also present in the Handschrift of the Anthropology, where 
Kant states: “the I which has been observed by itself is a sum total of so many 
objects [emphasis added] of inner perception” (1900, AA 7:399). It follows that 
we would become conscious of the “plurality” of the self rather than of its “unity”. 
My interpretation is in line with Aquila’s claim that 
Kant himself provides what might appear the most natural suggestion, if 
we assume that inner sense provides no direct awareness of the “self” or 
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the “subject” of experience. In that case, it would seem, inner sense must 
provide an awareness of at least some of those items that we might regard 
as “determinations” of the self. (Aquila, 1983, p. 154)
Aquila suggests that the list of these determinations includes not only 
Vorstellungen but also “feelings and inclinations and perhaps even in some sense 
“acts” of thinking and willing” (1983, p. 154). On the contrary, what subject 
perceives, according to Hume, is “nothing but a bundle or collection of different 
perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in 
a perpetual flux and movement” (Treatise, p. 252; see also Howell, 2001)4.
Collin Marshall argues that the Humean bundle view does not fit with Kant’s 
view of the self and offers two arguments. First, Marshall thinks that the relation 
between the self and its representations should be understood as follows: “the 
self is the thing that combines representations in synthesis” (Marshall, 2010, p. 
11); this relation, according to Marshall, simply cannot be admitted by Hume. 
Against this argument, I hold that he misses the crucial distinction between the 
empirical and the logical self (1900, AA 20:270; 7:134 footnote; 1998, CPR 
B407-8). Instead, he reduces Kant’s account of the self to its logical expression as 
unity of consciousness, overlooking the empirical representations such as feelings, 
thoughts, desires, etc., which are associated to the empirical self. 
As to the second argument, Marshall correctly holds that for Kant we do not 
know ourselves as we are in ourselves but as we appear to ourselves. He goes on, 
however, to claim that “appearances are representations, so if we are bundles 
of representations, then there needs to be another level of representations that 
is the appearance of that bundle. But this is clearly not Kant’s view” (Marshall, 
2010, p. 11). It is far from clear why he thinks that Hume’s view of bundle would 
be suitable for Kant’s account of the self when an “appearance of a bundle” is 
presupposed. Marshall turns the bundle into an appearance. On my account, inner 
sense provides with a stream of representations of our states which, in themselves, 
are nothing but empirical appearances (1900, AA 7:398; Prauss, 1971). Thus, it 
seems there is no reason to reject that the empirical self is, for Kant, a “bundle 
of appearances”, which are not unarranged unrelated representations, but rather 
representations related in time and determined by the understanding through 
categories (1998, CPR B157-8). The important point is the use of appearance as a 
“limiting” term that distinguishes the empirical cognition of the self as it is given in 
experience from the (unattainable) cognition of the self as it is in itself (1998, CPR 
B164; 1900, AA 7:398). I, nonetheless, agree with Henry E. Allison on admitting 
two essential differences between Hume and Kant: first, Kant distinguishes inner 
sense from apperception, and such distinction implies that the impossibility of 
intuiting the self as unity does not lead to reject the thought “I”. Second, unlike 
Hume, Kant justifies the possibility of a genuine inner experience (Allison, 2004).
4 All references to David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature will have this form (Treatise).
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3. Change and permanence in inner experience
This is where I want to express my disagreement with Rudolf Makkreel, who 
claims: “the representations of inner sense cannot be made clear and determinately 
fixed. They constitute an indeterminate temporal stream” [emphasis added] 
(Makkreel, 2014, p. 19). In contrast, I argue that the temporal relation of those 
representations already constitutes a kind of determination made by imagination, 
whose synthesis (figurative) submits the manifold of those representations under 
the abovementioned temporal rules (1998, CPR B151; Carl, 1992). In other words, 
Kant is underlining that those representations do not constitute “one object” but 
rather a stream of representations, so that when we are conscious of ourselves, we 
become aware of a stream or flow of states (e.g. thirsty, angry, etc.), in which none 
abiding state is continuously present throughout our life.
On top of that, Kant states in the Anthropology that outer objects in space 
appear next to each other and abidingly fixed, while inner sense “sees the relations 
of its determination only in time, hence in flux, where the stability of observation 
necessary for experience does not occur” (1900, AA 7:134). As Aquila notices, 
there is no reason to assume a parallel characterization of the material provided 
by inner (concerning ourselves) and outer sense (Aquila, 1983).  Perhaps the most 
notable asymmetry between outer appearances, given in space and time, and 
inner appearances, given only in time, consists in the abiding character of the 
material given in the former and the “fleeting” character of the latter. As he puts it: 
Although both are appearances, the appearance before outer sense has 
something standing and abiding in it, which supplies a substratum grounding 
the transitory determinations, and thus also a synthetic concept, namely that 
of space and of an appearance in it; whereas time, which is the only form of 
our inner intuition, has in it nothing abiding, and hence gives cognition only 
of a change of determinations, but not of the determinable object. (1998, 
CPR A381)
This suggests that we can only cognize, via empirical self-consciousness, the 
determinations of our mind which change in us, so that the cognition of a persistent 
enduring object is beyond our inner experience. The fact that “in that which we 
call the soul, everything is in continual flux, and it has nothing abiding” (1998, CPR 
A381) need not preclude us from arguing for a “dynamic” theory of the self, which 
regards the “self”, or rather the group of its states, as a living being that changes 
relentlessly (Aquila, 1983). Kant, nevertheless, holds that we can only determine 
the change in ourselves, if we have the perception of something persistent in 
relation to which the change is determined (1998, CPR BXXXIX footnote). Given 
that we cannot find the perception of something persistent in ourselves, then it 
should come from the actual existence of things outside us:
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The perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing 
outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me. 
Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only by 
means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself. (1998, 
CPR B275)
Kant suggests that inner sense is a necessary, but not sufficient condition of 
inner experience, since the empirical consciousness of our inner changes is made 
possible by outer experience (1998, CPR BXL footnote, A205/B250; Mohr, 1991). 
Here a contrast between Descartes and Kant concerning self-consciousness may 
be convenient, since Kant claims that self-consciousness relies on consciousness 
of outer objects while, for Descartes, the certainty of the subject’s existence is 
prior and apart from cognition of external things. Thus, it makes sense to hold 
that Descartes “understands self-consciousness as immediate, not as mediated 
by consciousness of anything different from the self” (Rockmore, 2012, p. 307). 
Kant, by contrast, conceives of empirical self-consciousness in terms of awareness 
of flowing representations that can be conceptualized by reference to an outer 
perception of substances (Aquila, 1983). Perhaps the human living body, which is 
changing over time, is not as persistent as a mountain, but even our spatiotemporal 
representations of it have a certain level of persistency, by which we are conscious 
of our inner changes: 
The persistence of the soul, merely as an object of inner sense, remains 
unproved and even unprovable, although its persistence in life, where the 
thinking being (as a human being) is at the same time an object of outer 
sense, is clear of itself. (1998, CPR B415)
Certainly, the human being does not consist merely of a mind but also of a 
body that can be object of outer sense, but the connection between body and 
soul is not relevant in Kant’s anthropological agenda (1998, A342/B400; 1900, 
AA 20:308; 23:31-32). Unlike Béatrice Longuenesse, I strongly believe that 
empirical self-consciousness should not be reduced merely to a consciousness of 
both “outside objects” and “the distinction between the temporal determinations 
of those objects and the temporal determinations of one’s perceptions and 
experience of them” (Longuenesse, 2006, p. 302). Of course, the empirical 
self-consciousness relies on outer sense inasmuch as the temporal organization 
of inner representations is only possible by means of external objects. However, 
Longuenesse overlooks the fact that the human being, via self-consciousness, is 
aware of a plentiful set of representations such as thoughts, memories, and feelings 
whose existence does not demand the current presence of external objects.
Of course, Kant contradicts the problematic idealism approach to self-
consciousness, suggesting that the temporal relation of our inner representations 
in the consciousness of our existence depends upon our experience of external 
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things of the world in which we live. For instance, we can be conscious of the 
fact that some thoughts or feelings take place regularly in our mind after, before 
or during other representations. We can also be conscious of the fact that those 
representations and the occurrence of certain external events take place at the 
same time. However, Mohr (1991) is right to say that the data of inner sense do 
not have a propositional structure, but our empirical ability to conceptualize all 
empirical data is conditioned to the language we learn in the community with others 
(1900, AA 7:127, 324; 25:1195-6, 1417). The human being has undoubtedly the 
capacity to formulate judgements concerning to its inner experience in which the 
I is the subject and various empirical are the predicate; for instance, “I am cold”, 
“I am dubious”, “I am ashamed”, etc., (1900, AA 18:186).
4. Feelings, sensations and perceptions as components of inner 
sense
Kant holds that inner sense and time constitute a totality in which all 
our representations are contained and takes inner sense for “the sum of all 
representations” (1998, CPR A155/B194; A177/B220). It is precisely this wide 
range of notions, contained by inner sense, what has motivated a disagreement 
on what is the matter of inner sense. For instance, Yalcin declares that “thought”, 
“desires”, “willing” and “decision-making” are not an inner manifold and, therefore, 
do not belong to inner sense. These, by contrast, belong to “the active aspect of 
the self” (Yalcin, 2002, p. 185). Kant, nevertheless, admits that the human being 
is empirically conscious of its mental operations. And if it is so, these operations 
would not be only representations of inner sense (empirical self-consciousness) 
but also would be determined by time, as long as the latter is the form of inner 
sense (1998, CPR A33/B49, A357). This seems to be borne out also by J. Vogel’s 
claim: “there is a way to characterize or provide content to the notion of oneself: 
as the subject of one’s various experiences, states and mental activities” (Vogel, 
1993, p. 881). 
As far as the matter of inner sense is concerned, H. J. Paton (1936) suggests 
that the immediate content of inner sense corresponds to feelings, desires and 
the stream of ideas. I deem correct G. Mohr’s interpretation that “concerning 
to different versions of the «object» of inner sense it follows that not the I but 
my thoughts and representations (my inner state) are the object of inner sense”5 
(Mohr, 1991, p. 71). In a similar manner, Patricia Kitcher holds that this matter 
is constituted by thoughts, perceptions and the temporal succession of thoughts 
and perceptions (Kitcher, 2016). According to Corey Dyck (2016), there are two 
objects of inner sense, namely thoughts (the mental states) and the subject itself. 
5 “Rückbezogen auf die verschiedenen Versionen des «Gegenstands» des inneren Sinns müßte daraus 
folgen, daß nicht das Ich, die Seele, sondern meine Gedanken, Vorstellungen (mein innerer Zustand) 
der Gegenstand des inneren Sinns sind” (Mohr, 1991, p. 71).
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Aquila (1983) collects a large number of things that can be regarded as the matter 
of inner sense, by saying that the “domain” or the “manifold” of inner sense can 
be constituted by: the mind, its inner state, inner determinations, modifications, 
alterations, thoughts, feeling, inclination, decision, representations, will, thoughts 
and thinking. 
Roughly speaking, if we admit that we intuit our inner states through inner 
sense (1998, CPR A38/B55) and ‘feelings’ (Gefühle) are nothing but a state of the 
mind, then we may say that feelings are an object of inner sense (1900, AA 7:231; 
20:208, 230). However, one might think that feelings cannot be an object of inner 
sense because Kant claims that:
Everything in our cognition that belongs to intuition (with the exception, 
therefore, of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and the will, which 
are not cognitions at all) contains nothing but mere relations, of places 
in one intuition (extension), alteration of places (motion), and laws in 
accordance with which this alteration is determined (moving forces) […] the 
representations of outer sense make up the proper material with which we 
occupy our mind. (1998, CPR A49/B66-7)
At first blush, this passage suggests that feelings and the will cannot reach the 
status of intuition and, therefore, they cannot be object of inner sense. This has 
led some commentators to downplay inner sense, suggesting that external objects 
alone are the object of inner sense (Wolff, 1963; Collins, 1999; Longuenesse, 
2006). Against this reading, I hold that feelings are excluded from inner sense in 
that passage, because Kant is concerned in the CPR with the cognition of outer 
objects rather than with the cognition of an immediate I-intuition in inner sense. In 
other words, Kant restricts the material of inner sense to external objects, because 
his “interests are primarily epistemological, and his account of our sensible faculties 
largely reflects that focus” (Valaris, 2008, p. 2)6. By contrast, S. Yalcin (2002) seems 
to hold a more flexible position, for he admits both an “official view”, according to 
which the manifold of inner sense is derived from outer sense and an “alternative 
view”, according to which inner sense has its own manifold constituted by the 
mind itself and its inner states. Accordingly, I think that inner sense per se should 
not be reduced to either an outer or inner manifold, but the sort of manifold 
depends on the object of cognition (ourselves or external objects).
Kant explicitly declares in CPR A357 that thoughts, consciousness, desires, 
etc., cannot be externally intuited, inasmuch as they belong to inner sense. In the 
same way, feelings, inclinations or decisions are not contained by outer sense and, 
then, their existence in our mind should be contained by inner sense (1998, CPR 
6 The concepts of ‘pleasure’ (Lust) and ‘displeasure’ (Unlust), ‘desire’ (Begierde) and ‘inclination’ 
(Neigung) have an empirical origin and cannot belong to the transcendental philosophy, which is 
concerned with the a priori conditions of cognition (1998, CPR A14-5/B28-9).
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A358). Feelings belong to sensibility (1900, AA 7:200; 6:211 footnote) and they 
provide our consciousness with a source of empirical representations of ourselves, 
but they cannot reach the status of intuition (1900, AA 7:239-40; 20:206, 222; 
5:189), for feelings of pleasure and displeasure are not related to objects but to 
the subject alone, and they are not nor can provide cognition about outer objects:
Any relation of representations, however, even that of sensations, can be 
objective (in which case it signifies what is real in an empirical representation); 
but not the relation to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, by means of 
which nothing at all in the object is designated, but in which the subject 
feels itself as it is affected by the representation. (1900, AA 5:203-4)
Feelings of pleasure and displeasure are not, according to Kant, sensations but 
the effect of a sensation, for they are subjective representations that express only 
states of the subject by reference to the representation of an object that might or 
not exist in experience (1900, AA 6:211-2; 1998, CPR A29/B44). Even though 
feelings do not contribute to the cognition of external objects, they still contribute 
to a pragmatic self-knowledge, by informing us the sort of effect (pleasant or 
displeasing) produced by our sensation of objects. This view is endorsed by J. 
H. V. Kirchmann who believes that self-perception, by its own nature, can only 
convert existing states of the soul into a knowledge that would be composed by 
feelings, desires and other existing representations which are mixed in the human 
soul (Kirchmann, 1869).  I further support H. J. Paton’s reading that feelings are 
the material of inner sense. As he puts it: “by inner sense we are immediately 
aware, not only of our feelings and desires, but also of the stream of ideas which, 
whatever else they are, are for Kant modifications or states of our minds” (Paton, 
1936, pp. 99-100). In a similar manner, N. Kemp Smith holds that the content of 
inner sense is double:
On the one hand we have feelings, desires volitions, that is, states of the 
mind in the strict sense, subjective non-spatial existences. On the other we 
have sensations, perceptions, images, concepts, in a word, representations 
(Vorstellungen) of every possible type. These latter all refer to the external 
world in space. (Kemp Smith, 2003, p. 293)
Kant holds that feelings are the effect of sensation on states of the mind, so that 
they force the subject to leave a particular state is disagreeable to it or to remain 
in a specific state, if it is agreeable (1900, AA 7:230-1; 1998, CPR A29/B44). The 
acts of leaving or remaining in one state depends on the change of sensation that 
occurs in time, for it entails a temporal sequence in the subject’s thoughts and in 
the consciousness of such change: 
We are led along irresistibly in the stream of time and in the change of 
sensations connected with it. Now even if leaving one point of time and 
entering another is one and the same act (of change), there is still a temporal 
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sequence in our thought and in the consciousness of this change; in 
conformity with the relation of cause and effect. (1900, AA 7:231)
Accordingly, the occurrence of change in our feelings and the act of being 
conscious of such change through inner sense are equally conditioned to time. 
For all our representations are related as one after other in conformity with time’s 
dimension (1998, CPR A31/B47).  Life turns out to be a set of continuous opposite 
states in time, for “enjoyment is the feeling of promotion of life; pain is that of 
a hindrance of life. But (animal) life, as physicians also have already noted, is 
a continuous play of the antagonism of both” (1900, AA 7:231). Of course, all 
changes of the mind’s states are determined by a succession of tensed points 
(instants) of time, in which they are present, past or future events (Pacheco Acosta, 
2018). In fact, since the human being exists in the stream of time, wherein the 
present becomes past while future becomes present now, each state of its mind, no 
matter whether it is pleasant or not, will be replaced by an indeterminate different 
state. Therefore, the correct combination between pain and enjoyment produces 
health in human beings. That is, health does not consist in a continuously felt well-
being but in a set of intermittent agreeable feelings (1900, AA 7:231). I am against 
those commentators, who exclude prematurely feelings from inner sense without 
noticing that Kant is concerned in that passage with the knowledge of external 
objects rather than with the self and its inner states (Allison, 2004; Yalcin, 2002; 
Melnick, 2009; Schmitz, 2013).
Moreover, Kant holds in Anthropology: “the latter [inner sense], as a mere 
faculty of perception (of empirical intuition), is to be thought of differently than the 
feeling of pleasure and pain” (1900, AA 7:153). This passage should be carefully 
interpreted, since Kant is not denying that feelings are object of inner sense, he is 
rather pointing out that inner sense cannot be equated with feelings. This is natural 
because inner sense is fundamentally a receptive faculty of cognition that cannot 
produce spontaneously representations, but it is subject to the understanding. 
Feelings of pleasure and displeasure are nothing but particular modifications of 
the mind. 
Furthermore, Kant holds that if a determination of the feeling of pleasure or 
displeasure is regarded as sensation, the latter “is related solely to the subject, 
and does not serve for any cognition at all, not even that by which the subject 
cognizes [emphasis added] itself” (1900, AA 5:206). However, this statement is 
nuanced by Kant himself, who does not exclude feelings from inner sense but, 
rather, wants to differentiate sensation from feelings by appealing to a subjective-
objective criterion. According to this criterion, feelings (unlike sensation) are 
merely subjective and cannot be objective representations of an object. As a 
result, the idea that “the subject cannot cognize itself” would mean that the 
subject represents itself through feelings but these representations could not 
reach the status of “cognition” of its own self, because these cannot constitute 
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objective representations of itself. That does not mean, however, that we 
cannot reach an anthropological cognition of ourselves grounded on subjective 
representations.
Inner experience contains linked-in-time representations of our states, which 
we are consciousness of, through empirical apperception (1900, AA 7:142).  Inner 
and outer experiences rely on inner and outer sense respectively, which provide 
us with empirical representations of ourselves and of external objects. I am in 
agreement with A. Cohen, who suggests that “through one’s inner experience, one 
can observe the play of motives, inclinations, desires, and intentions, and derive 
from it empirical knowledge of oneself” (Cohen, 2009, p. 52). It is noteworthy 
to mention that Kant does not use the expression ‘self-feeling’ (Selbstgefühl) in 
his theory of inner sense and the use of this term is very fragmentary and out of 
discussion (1900, AA 15:58, 689, 725). This despite the fact that, as Thiel (1997) 
notices, the term of “Selbstgefühl” was present in 1770s discussions of inner sense 
and it was probably introduced into philosophical terminology by J. B. Basedow in 
1764, taken up from Basedow afterwards by J. G. Feder. 
According to Kant, an empirical intuition is a representation that “is related 
to the object through sensation” (1998, CPR A19-20/B34), while sensation is “a 
perception [emphasis added] that refers to the subject as a modification of its state” 
(1998, CPR A320/B376). It implies that a sensation (e.g. color, sound, sharpness, 
etc.) is not yet intuition, nor an a priori condition of our knowledge of objects, 
nor an intrinsic property of objects in themselves. Sensation is rather a subjective 
representation that belongs to the particular constitution of sense in the subject, 
that is, a modification of our state (1998, CPR A28-9/B44). Kant further divides 
‘senses of physical sensation’ (die Sinne Körperempfindung) into vital sensation and 
organic sensation: 
Sensations of warm and cold, even those that are aroused by the mind (e.g., 
by quickly rising hope or fear), belong to vital sensation. The shudder that 
seizes the human being himself at the representation of the sublime, and the 
horror, with which nurses’ tales drive children to bed late at night, belong to 
vital sensation. (1900, AA 7:154)
Since sensation is a particular content of inner sense, these two kinds of 
sensations would belong to the content of inner sense. Inner sense, nonetheless, 
contains not only sensations but also intuitions and perceptions, i.e. empirical 
representations accompanied by our consciousness (1998, CPR B155-6, 1900, 
AA 7:144). It is my contention that these representations do not arise through a 
purely “internalist” activity of the subject regardless of the influence of outer sense 
but these arise in social intercourse. That is to say, the play of ideas that exist in 
inner sense, without any reference to outer sense, should not be considered as 
‘experiential knowledge’ (Erfahrungserkenntnis) but as fiction: 
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The tendency to retire into oneself, together with the resulting illusions of 
inner sense, can only be set right when the human being is led back into 
the external world and by means of this to the order of things present to the 
outer senses. (1900, AA 7: 162)
Accordingly, the content of inner experience which is concerned with ourselves 
does not consist in a set of fictitious, nor a priori representations. This rather relies 
on the material derived from sensibility. However, human beings can be aware not 
only of their sensations and feelings, but also of sensationless representations that 
compel them to do any activity: “even if no positive pain stimulates us to activity, 
if necessary a negative one, boredom, will often affect us in such a manner that we 
feel driven to do something harmful to ourselves rather than nothing at all” (1900, 
AA 7:232-3). Indeed, the human being tends to leave the state of boredom, insofar 
as it produces a fearful oppressive difficulty in its interior. As far as the human 
being attends to the relation between its life and time, it undergoes the oppressive 
and frightening arduousness of boredom. In my view, Kant is here referring to a 
sort of “phenomenal” time, namely, time in the first-person experience. 
In the first-person experience, the human being at times wishes to jump 
from one moment to another in order to avoid unpleasant experiences: “this 
pressure or impulse to leave every point of time we are in and pass over into the 
following one is accelerating and can grow until a man makes the resolution to 
end his life” (1900, AA 7:233). Indeed, the human being avoids to perceive ‘the 
empty of sensations’ (Leere an Empfindungen) in its existence, which produces a 
presentiment of a slow death, which is taken for more painful even than death. 
This is why things that shorten time are regarded as enjoyments, and the quicker 
the human being makes the time pass, the more this will feel refreshed (1900, AA 
7:233-4). Thus, despite Kant rejects, from a theoretical perspective, any empirical 
intuition of time (1998, CPR A176/B219, A166/B207, A172/B214, A182-3/B225-
6), he reflects, from an anthropological perspective, on the way in which the 
human being experiences time.
5. Conclusion
Kant’s theory of inner experience contains an empirical doctrine that describes 
the way in which we become aware of representations derived from our own inner 
experience. In this doctrine we deal with concepts like empirical apperception, 
intuitive self-consciousness, the I of apprehension, the empirical consciousness of 
one’s existence. These concepts emerge from experience and are employed to 
provide an anthropological or psychological description of the mental phenomena 
in humans. However, this theory of inner experience integrates also an a priori 
doctrine that explains how our experience of objects is possible. In this doctrine 
we deal with concepts like pure or transcendental apperception, discursive self-
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consciousness, the I of reflection, intellectual consciousness of one’s existence. 
These concepts are necessary conditions for the possibility of experience, because 
they play a logical role in the possibility of human cognition. That is to say, these 
describe the way in which the manifold of intuition is connected by the categories 
of the understanding as well as the synthetic unity of the understanding and its 
domain over all our representations.
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